Ranked Pairs (winning votes)
Duels are sorted by the winner’s number of votes. The most widespread variant today.
The transparent alternative to Schulze: duels are kept one by one, from the most decisive to the closest, and anyone can follow the calculation by hand. Almost always the same winner.
When to choose it: when you want to be able to explain the result duel by duel, or if your bylaws specify it.
Ranked Pairs sorts all the duels won, from the most decisive to the closest, then locks them in one by one, except those that would form a cycle with the ones before: they are skipped.
The locked duels draw an order free of contradictions: the winner is the option that none of them beats, and the ranking follows.
Same calculation; only the strength given to each victory changes. Without ties on the ballots, both variants always give the same result; they can diverge when voters rank options as tied, or leave some out (those then count as tied, last).
Duels are sorted by the winner’s number of votes. The most widespread variant today.
Duels are sorted by the vote margin, as in Tideman’s original papers.
45 voters rank Camille first, with Adèle and Sophie tied behind; 11 rank Adèle first, with the other two tied. With winning votes, the weakest victory is Sophie’s (29 votes): it gives way, and Adèle wins. With margins, it is Camille’s victory over Sophie, by a single vote: Sophie wins.
Almost all of Schulze’s guarantees, plus local independence.
| Criterion | Ranked Pairs | First-past-the-post |
|---|---|---|
| Majority An option ranked first by more than half of the voters wins. | Yes | Yes |
| Majority loser An option ranked last by more than half of the voters never wins. | Yes | No |
| Mutual majority If a majority ranks a group of options ahead of all the others, the winner belongs to that group. | Yes | No |
| Condorcet winner The option that beats each of the others in a duel is always elected. | Yes | No |
| Condorcet loser The option beaten by each of the others in a duel is never elected. | Yes | No |
| Smith criterion The winner belongs to the smallest group of options that beat every option outside it. | Yes | No |
| Independence of clones Adding an option very similar to another does not change the outcome among the others. | Yes Note 1 | No |
| Monotonicity Ranking the winner higher can never make them lose. | Yes | Yes |
| Local independence Removing the option that finished last (or first) in the result does not change the order of the others. | Yes | No |
| Reversal symmetry If every ballot is reversed, the former winner no longer wins. | Yes | No |
| Participation Voting sincerely can never leave a voter worse off than abstaining. | No | Yes |
| Consistency If an option wins in two separate groups, it wins when they are combined. | No | Yes |
| Later-no-harm Ranking an additional choice can never hurt those already ranked ahead of it. | No | Yes Note 2 |
| Resolvability A final tie becomes unlikely as the number of voters grows. | Yes | Yes |
| Fast computation The result is computed in polynomial time, even with many options. | Yes | Yes |
| Type | Reference |
|---|---|
| Encyclopedia | Ranked pairs Wikipedia |
| Documentation | Voting Methods CondorcetPHP · docs.condorcet.io |
| Paper | Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules T. Nicolaus Tideman (1987) · Social Choice and Welfare 4(3) |