Blockchain

What will never change once the vote opens. Cosmetic presentation (logo, photos, thank-you message) is deliberately outside the block, unhashed.

title, description?, organizer_name strings

Informative context, signed with the block but never a tally input.

election_type preferential | fptp

Ranked ballot (Condorcet methods) or single choice. The Condorcet method itself is published with the result, not here.

seats integer ≥ 1

Seats to fill.

voter_access_mode string

closed_nominative_list in version 1.

enrolment_mandatory boolean

Voter-brought keys only (BYO-only) when true; server-generated keys allowed when false.

non_anonymous_voting, nominative_participation, weighted_voting booleans

The three privacy and weighting options. non_anonymous_voting = true forces nominative_participation = true (schema-enforced).

max_ring_size integer ≥ 1

The ring-size ceiling of this election: no ring exceeds it, every emergency ring is exactly this size.

initial_electoral_roll_size integer ≥ 0

The electoral roll size at the opening. Voters may be added during the vote; the closure roll gives the final size, so the number of additions is public, never who.

ballot_rules object

ties_allowed, partial_ranking_allowed, blank_allowed, full_ranking_required: the ballot parameters from which tally constraints are derived deterministically.

candidates[].label array of 2 to 30 objects

Unique labels, 1 to 64 characters, sorted by label (byte order). The label is the sole candidate identifier.

The complete list of public keys of each ring. Block 1 carries the launch rings; any later rings block carries one emergency ring, deducible from its position. A ring’s member set is frozen for good once published.

rings[].ring_id UUID

The ring identifier referenced by every ballot signed against it; rings sorted by ring_id.

rings[].ring_digest ring_<64 hex>_<8 hex>

The canonical cryptoVote digest of the ring’s member set, independent of order. Derivable from public_keys (a verifier recomputes it); it is published so a voter can compare it with the digest their browser computed from the ring they were served.

rings[].public_keys[] pk_<64 hex>_<8 hex>

Checksummed prefixed public keys, sorted ascending, unique; at most max_ring_size per ring.

Launch rings share one size per election (between the 100-key floor and the ceiling); emergency rings hold exactly the ceiling; a BYO-only election’s rings hold its enrolled membership, evenly partitioned.

Ballots are published in batches of at least 600 (the remainder at closing), never one by one, and sorted by key image within each block: no timestamp, no arrival order.

ballots[].ring_id UUID

The ring whose public keys the signature verifies against.

ballots[].key_image ki_<64 hex>_<8 hex>

The election-scoped key image: unique per election. A second ballot with the same key image is a double vote, publicly evident. Sort key of the block.

ballots[].signature blsag_…

The linkable ring signature (bLSAG variant over Ristretto255) over the exact payload bytes.

ballots[].payload string (opaque JSON)

The signed document, verbatim: {"v":1,"election":"…","ballot":"A>B=C","weight":1[,"voter":"…"]}. Never re-serialized (see the payload schema).

The ballot field is a flat string in CEF ranking syntax (or the /EMPTY_RANKING/ sentinel). Its content is deliberately not validated: a malformed expression is classified as a null ballot at tally by a published, reproducible rule.

Exactly one, last, nothing after it. Holding the signed closure block is the proof a chain is complete. The participation register appears here once, never during the vote.

totals object of integers

block_count, ballot_count, ring_count, voted_count, voted_weight, cross-checkable against the chain itself.

electoral_roll[].voter_id UUID v4

The published voter ID (a random pseudonym); the roll at the close, sorted by voter_id, one line per voter, none marked as added.

electoral_roll[].key_provisioning_mode string

server_generated, organizer_imported or voter_enrolled: whether the platform ever held this voter’s key is a public fact.

electoral_roll[].ring_id UUID or null

The ring the voter voted in; null if they did not vote. The verifiable voter → ring link.

electoral_roll[].distribution_count integer ≥ 0

How many keys were distributed to the voter (3 at most by default; organizer-granted extras stay visible).

electoral_roll[].has_voted, weight boolean, integer ≥ 1

Participation flag and authoritative ballot weight (1 unless weighted_voting).

electoral_roll[].voter_name, email_digest strings, optional

Nominative disclosure only, on voters who voted: clear name and SHA3-256(election_id ‖ normalized e-mail).